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This paper empirically analyzes the question whether government involvement in the 
economy is conducive or detrimental to life satisfaction in a cross-section of 74 
countries. This provides a test of a longstanding dispute between standard neoclassical 
economic theory, which predicts that government plays an unambiguously positive role 
for individuals’ quality of life, and public choice theory, that was developed to 
understand why governments often choose excessive involvement and regulation, 
thereby harming voters’ quality of life. Our results show that life satisfaction decreases 
with higher government spending. This negative impact of the government is stronger in 
countries with a leftwing median voter. It is alleviated by government effectiveness – 
but only in countries where the state sector is already small.  
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  1Introduction 
The government’s optimal share in the economy has for decades been subject to 
considerable debate. While in Western Europe government spending was on average 
well below 30 percent of output 30 years ago, it has risen rapidly to its current level of 
about 50 percent.
1 One popular answer to why this has happened is given by public 
choice theory: special interest groups benefit from particular government actions – at 
the cost, however, of overall efficiency and well-being. As the benefits for each 
individual of the small special interest group are huge, whereas the costs to each 
member of society are rather small, government sizes become larger and larger as 
politicians maximize their re-election probability. Consequently, even if a huge majority 
of voters favours a smaller state sector, resistance against each particular cut in public 
spending and government activities is stronger than support, preventing a reduction in 
government size.
2 Governments, then, would be perceived as being inefficiently large 
by the huge majority of citizens, creating feelings of frustration and missing 
identification with their state. People living in such environment, in turn, are likely to be 
less satisfied with their life in general, the more so, the less efficient they perceive their 
governments’ activities and the less its actions are in accordance with their preferences. 
It is this link between the government activity and life satisfaction that we investigate in 
this paper.  
Clearly, governments have important roles for society, and the optimal size of 
the state sector is most likely substantially greater than zero. According to classical 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Roubini and Sachs (1989). For more recent evidence see Persson (2002).  
2 “For the initiator [of a new system] has the enmity of all who would profit by the preservation of the old 
institution and merely lukewarm defenders in those who would gain by the new ones”, Machiavelli, The 
Prince, 1513, cited in Feinberg (2005). 
  2economic theory, the state has to provide important public goods, where markets fail to 
provide them (Musgrave, 1959). More modern economic theory also emphasizes the 
role of the state in providing institutional frameworks without which the markets would 
not work efficiently, or would not function at all (Blankart, 2003). The 1997 World 
Bank World Development Report likewise focussed on the beneficial influence of 
effective states (World Bank, 1997). The optimal size of the state depends on the 
preferences of its citizens, and varies from country to country.  
Identifying this optimal size is beyond the scope of this paper. In this 
contribution, we try to answer the question of whether, on average, people are more 
satisfied with their life in countries with bigger state sectors when we control for other 
relevant determinants of well-being. In part, our analysis might contribute to answering 
the question whether people perceive their state sector as being inefficiently overblown 
(as would be predicted by public choice theory) or as being necessary for the provision 
of public goods (according to neo-classic theory) and thus objectively ‘good’. 
We investigate the link between life satisfaction and government involvement 
empirically, using data from the World Values Survey for a cross section of about 70 
countries (aggregated at the country level). Our findings rather clearly support the view 
forwarded by public choice theory. Basically, life satisfaction decreases with 
government’s active involvement in the economy although its negative impact is weaker 
in countries with rightwing median voters. 
The paper continues as follows. In the next section, we present our theoretical 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and method of estimation, while results are 
reported in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
  3Theoretical considerations 
In very broad terms, economic science includes two conflicting views on government 
activities. First, according to the ‘standard’ neo-classical view, standard theory focuses 
on the role of governments in solving market failures: It solves coordination problems 
in society, thereby making the functioning of the market economy possible, and 
remedies misallocations achieved through the market process (Musgrave, 1959; 
Blankart, 2003). For example, governments set and maintain the institutional framework 
for market transactions (norms and rules, courts, and institutions for enforcement). 
Governments facilitate the emergence of markets and exchange of goods through the 
provision of guaranteed, widely accepted means of exchange (money) and intervene in 
case of market failures like, e.g., the abuse of market power, positive and negative 
externalities, and the provision of public goods which are not provided by private 
suppliers due to their specific characteristics (see Blankart, 2003; Musgrave, 1959, 
Pigou, 1920, 1928).
3 According to this neo-classical theory, government acts as a 
’benevolent dictator’, aiming at maximizing societal welfare. In such a case, the size of 
the government sector will fully correspond with the desires of the majority of the 
electorate. These considerations lead us to hypothesis 1a: 
Hypothesis 1a: Governments act as benevolent dictators by maximizing 
the well-being of their citizens, implying that average life satisfaction 
increases with the size of the state sector (the ‘classic’ view). 
 
The second view on governments arises from public choice theory, which was 
developed in an attempt to understand government behaviour that does not conform to 
                                                 
3 Typical textbook examples are national defense and infrastructure. 
  4the standard neoclassical theory. According to the public choice view, utility-
maximizing behavior observed for actors in markets is also present in the non-market 
activities of (1) government officials, administrators and bureaucrats; and (2) politicians 
who pursue their own interests when deciding on and carrying out government 
activities.
4 Hence, instead of market failures public choice theory focuses on 
government failures and how they come about. 
In particular, bureaucrats and ministers in the monopolized government sector 
aim to maximize their budgets (Niskanen, 1971) or, if budget size is constrained, 
personal staff and spending, at the expense of the means designated for their productive 
activities (Williamson, 1964).
5 Excessive budget growth - an indicator of unnecessary 
government activity - is also facilitated by administrative procedures and tight 
deadlines, which prevent conducting a profound cost-benefit analysis (Wildavsky, 
1964). Finally, larger administrations, in turn, require more resources to control them 
(Mueller, 2003), so that a growing government size automatically triggers 
disproportionally higher expenses. 
Moreover, the behavior of politicians who aim to be re-elected may also 
contribute to a misallocation of resources through government involvement. They 
engage in log-rolling to promote projects favored by their own districts but not by the 
total population (Tullock, 1959; Weingast et al., 1981). Furthermore, according to what 
                                                 
4 Besley and Coate (1997) develop a theoretical model suggesting that regular elections do not hinder 
representatives to follow their own interests once they are in office.  
5 Vaubel, Dreher and Soylu (2005) show that the same holds true for international organizations. In a 
panel of 27 organizations over the period 1950-2001 they find that staff growth is considerably higher as 
would be expected for a given increase in membership and tasks. Figlio and O'Sullivan (2001) report 
similar evidence regarding publicly provided goods like schooling, fire protection and policing at the 
municipal level in the US.  
  5is known as the theory of fiscal illusion, government activities favored by politicians are 
those which are ‘visible’ to the public at the expense of potentially more welfare 
increasing, but ’invisible’ government projects (Puviani, 1903).
6 Similarly, Becker’s 
(1983) model of lobbying activities of interest groups – relying on insights gained by 
Olson (1965) – indicates that unnecessary government expenses are often the result of 
such lobbying activities,
7 and that a lot of government spending occurs in the form of 
public goods.
8 Political stability fosters an increase in the number of interest groups, 
which again causes rising government outlays (Olson, 1982), i.e. government activity 
not in line with the preferences of the voters.
9  
In summary, public choice theory predicts a misallocation of resources, a blown-
up government budget and thus an exploitation of voters’ incomes as a fiscal commons 
(e.g. Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) through government involvement, which 
consequently will decrease people’s satisfaction. These considerations lead to 
hypothesis 1b: 
Hypothesis 1b: Governments maximize their own well-being at the cost of 
society at large, implying that average life satisfaction decreases with the 
size of the state sector (the ‘public choice’ view). 
 
                                                 
6 For empirical support on the link between the visibility of expenses and tax burden for a cross-section of 
Swiss municipalities in 1970 see Pommerehne and Schneider (1978). 
7 Grossman and Helpman (1996) construct a model that shows how policy outcomes can easily be 
influenced by such interest groups. For empirical evidence see Tosini and Tower (1987), among others.  
8 The same model explains the positive correlation between economic development and the absolute size 
of the government sector. 
9 Borcherding (1985) found for the US that only 50% of the growth in government expenses over the 
period 1902 to 1978 can be explained by the median voter model. Results for other European countries 
are similar (Blankart, 2003, chapter 9; Pommerehne, 1987, chapter 6). 
  6Clearly, government activities imply trade-offs between the impact of these 
resources on factors of well-being and the loss in well-being generated by the associated 
taxes and the loss of control over personal income. The more efficiently the money is 
spent, then, the more beneficial is the trade-off between taxes and public spending from 
the tax payers’ perspective. We thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of government activity on well-being depends 
positively on the effectiveness of the government sector. 
 
Political competition might also be important for the impact of the quality of 
government’s economic involvement and how it affects well-being. Alt and Lassen 
(2002) and Adserá et al. (2003), for example, suggest that political competition reduces 
rent-seeking behavior by providing a check on corrupt politicians. In addition, 
competition between many candidates might lead to less excessive spending as voters 
can get rid more easily of those politicians who serve lobbying groups (Besley and 
Coate, 2001; Myerson, 1993).
10 Furthermore, political competition might imply the 
necessity to form coalition governments which reflect a broader scope of preferences 
than a single party government (Lijphart, 1977), that will also lead to corresponding 
government activities, serving the specific interests of more individuals. Finally, 
stronger political competition might induce government involvement to be ‘better’ 
targeted to voters’ preferences, leading to the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a: The impact of government activity on well-being depends 
positively on the degree of political competition in the country. 
                                                 
10 Persson (2002) and Persson et al. (2000) found that larger electoral districts, indicating lower barriers to 
entry and thus more competition between candidates, decrease corruption.    
  7 
However, according to Payne’s (1991) ‘legislator insecurity hypothesis’ a 
stronger competition between parties increases the fear of ruling governors of not being 
re-elected which makes them increase government activities and spending beyond what 
they personally think is desirable in order to ’buy’ votes.
11 A similar argument is that in 
situations with high political insecurity the ruling parties constrain the intertemporal 
substitution possibilities and spending policies of their competitors and potential 
successors through excessive government spending and deficits (Alesina and Tabellini, 
1990; Tabellini and Alesina, 1990; Persson and Svenson, 1989).
12 Furthermore, 
coalitions proxied by party competition might also lead to more spending ministries and 
an excessively big government budget and thus to a waste of resources in the economy 
as compared to a single party government when each member of the coalition wants to 
leave her fingerprint on the chosen policy.
13 Finally, increased party competition can be 
caused by (and be an indicator of) the activity of lobbying groups attracted by the rents 
attached to political offices (Besley and Coate, 2001). Therefore we reach the opposite 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3b: The impact of government size on well-being depends 
negatively on the degree of political competition in the country. 
                                                 
11 For empirical evidence of the political business cycle in spending, see, e.g., Nordhaus 1975. For the 
positive link between a negative income shock and government spending as a share of GDP, see Persson 
(2002). Persson and Tabellini (2000), however, show that the direction of the impact of such shock also 
depends on the electoral rules and regime types.  
12 Persson (2002) reports a positive link between a cut in income tax and the pre-election period, and a 
negative link between government spending and post-election periods. Schuknecht (1996, 2000) and 
Dreher and Vaubel (2004) confirm that fiscal policies are more expansive prior to elections.  
13 For empirical evidence on the effect of the size of coalitions on government size controlling for the 
ideology of the government see, e.g., Roubini and Sachs (1989).  
  8 
Finally, government ideology is likely to be another important determinant of 
the impact of government size on well-being. If voters prefer tighter safety-nets and 
publicly provided goods and services, they are more likely to accept more 
redistribution, which implies higher tax rates and a more interfering and active 
government. Traditionally, left-wing governments are thought to favor higher 
government spending and to pursue countercyclical Keynesian policy of government 
spending, which reduces fluctuation of people's personal income.
14 In addition, di Tella 
and MacCulloch (2005) show that leftwing voters are more inclined to support 
government spending. Thus: 
Hypothesis 4a: The impact of government activities on well-being 
depends positively on the extent to which the median voter has a ‘left-
wing’ ideology. 
 
However, traditionally it is believed that leftwing ideology would probably 
recommend a more active role for the government sector by assuming that – in the 
terminology of public choice theory – market failures appear more frequently than 
government failures (Lybeck, 1988).
15 Theoretical models based on class-specific 
voting have suggested that leftwing and rightwing parties equally favour progressive 
income taxation (Roemer, 1999), although they represent different income classes. On 
                                                 
14 Roubini and Sachs (1989), among others, have shown that a left-to-the-centre ideology is indeed linked 
with a larger share of government spending in GNP. To the contrary, Dreher (2005) finds no significant 
impact of left-wing governments on government total and social spending in OECD countries over the 
period 1970-2000.  
15 For empirical support on the influence of party ideology on votes about free-trade issues, see Baldwin 
(1985), Tosini and Tower (1987), among others. 
  9the other hand, vote-maximizing political parties might carry out such a transfer policy 
either to induce a shift in central votes to their favour or in favour of their own 
supporters, depending on the specific set-up of the model (Dixit and Londregan, 1996, 
1998). Therefore, a leftwing political tradition might inhibit different voters’ free choice 
of consumption in everyday life. In addition, one could argue that the mix of 
government activities might depend on the political ideology of the government and the 
political-ideological tradition of the country. Thus: 
Hypothesis 4b: The impact of government activities on well-being 
depends negatively on the extent to which the median voter has a ‘left-
wing’ ideology. 
 
We test this set of conflicting hypotheses in the following, using a data set that we 
describe in the next section. 
 
Data and Method 
The data used here derive from different sources. First of all, the data on life satisfaction 
are from the third and fourth waves of the World Values Survey (1997 - 2001) 
(Inglehart et al., 2004). The WVS asks the question “How satisfied are you with your 
life these days?”, which is evaluated on a 1-10 scale. We follow the WVS approach by 
using the percentage of the population answering in the top three categories (8-10), i.e. 
the aggregated data measure the share of each (sub-)population that is completely 
satisfied with their lives. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. Following the 
robustness analysis in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2005), the full national samples 
are split in three different ways. First, we split the national samples into three equally-
  10sized income groups, based on the WVS coding. Second, we split the national samples 
into men and women; and finally, we split them into two groups consisting of leftwing 
and rightwing voters, respectively.
16 This enables us to identify the potentially 
differential effects on groups in society, although it should be stressed that average life 
satisfaction in the subsamples is obtained from less observations and is therefore less 
precise than for the whole sample. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Again following Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2005), we estimate the effects 
of government involvement in the economy on life satisfaction using OLS. The baseline 
specification consists of social trust, openness to trade, the investment price, the log of 
GDP per capita, and a dummy for postcommunist countries. Social trust derives from 
the WVS and is the percentage of the population answering yes to the question “In 
general, do you think that most people can be trusted?” Openness to trade, measured as 
the sum of exports and imports as percentage of GDP, the investment price level 
relative to the US level, and the log of GDP per capita in 2000 are derived from the 
Penn World Tables, Mark 6.1 (Heston et al., 2002). Openness and the investment price 
level are averaged over the preceding ten-year period to avoid random fluctuations and 
                                                 
16 In practice, this is done by splitting the WVS database along the political middle and extracting life 
satisfaction scores for each country in both halves. We use the WVS question of where on a ten-point left-
to-right scale of political ideology people would place themselves; the average score is approximately 5.5. 
Using this question has the advantage that people obviously answer the question compared to some 
national average ideology, a fact that can be derived from the observation that virtually all countries have 
ideological means close to 5.5. As such, the data are insensitive to differences in national ideology. The 
exception is Vietnam that surprisingly seems very rightwing although the country is a communist 
dictatorship. 
  11short-run business cycles. In addition, the baseline includes a set of regional dummies 
covering Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, 
and Latin America. Finally, the variable of real interest is the governments’ involvement 
in the economy, which we measure by its share of GDP, again derived from the Penn 
World Tables and averaged as other variables.
17 We use this variable as it arguably 
provides the most accurate measure of the share of total income that is administrated by 
the government. This measure includes not only the classical government consumption 
but also governmental investment and direct government activity on the production side 
of the economy. Since GDP is measured in market prices, it is the welfare aspect of the 
national product which is in our focus: it shows how consumers assess the value of the 
produced consumption goods in an economy. Goods produced by the government are 
evaluated at their costs and thus might not reflect the consumers' benefit attached to 
those goods in full.
18 It should be noted that some government activities which are not 
mirrored by budgetary processes are not reflected in this variable; it can be conjectured 
that the size of this non-measurable government activity increases in its observable part. 
We include three additional variables allowing for transmission channels of the 
impact of government activities’ impact corresponding to hypotheses 2-4. To measure 
the effectiveness with which governments deliver public goods and services, we include 
the 2002 measure of ‘government effectiveness’ from Kaufmann et al. (2003). As a 
proxy of political competition, we include the Herfindahl index of the legislature from 
Beck et al. (2001), averaged over 1990-2000. This variable, distributed between zero 
and one, measures the lack of competition, as a value of 1 implies that the entire 
                                                 
17 We use average values to smooth out random noise (Heston et al., 2002). 
18 Thus, if civil servants’ wages exceed the wage level in the private labour market, publicly provided 
goods might be overvalued.  
  12legislature during all ten years were from the same party. As the third factor, we include 
a measure of political ideology of the three largest government parties, averaged over 
the period 1990-2000.
19
In order to ensure that these three variables that are to be interacted with the 
government’s share in GDP indeed delineate different characteristics, Table 2 reports 
the correlations between the variables and the dependent variable. With one exception, 
the table quite clearly shows that the variables measure different characteristics of 
society as the correlations are low and insignificant. The exception is government 
effectiveness, which shows a strong correlation with the government’s share in GDP. 
As such, the interaction term between those variables might simply pick up a non-linear 
relation between life satisfaction and the government’s share.
20 However, it appears that 
the correlation between government effectiveness and size is caused by both variables 
being correlated with GDP per capita. Once this has been taken into account, the partial 
correlation is small, indicating that the variables are likely to measure distinctly 
different factors. 
 
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Due to data limitations, the sample used in the following consists of between 69 
and 74 countries; we exclude China and Iran due to apparent irregularities in their WVS 
                                                 
19 The ideology measure is a slight modification of the index developed in Bjørnskov (2005a). The 
difference is that we use the ideology of the three largest parties in government, weighted by their number 
of seats in parliament. 
20 It should be stressed that we have also performed tests of a non-linear association between the 
government’s share and life satisfaction without finding supporting evidence. This result can be 
interpreted as all countries lying on the downward sloping part of an inverted u-function.  
  13data (Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2005b). Before turning to the empirical results, a few 
features of the raw data in Table 1 are worth noting. As could be expected, the lower 
income group appears to be the least satisfied, followed by the middle income group 
and with the upper income group as the most satisfied. However, the former difference 
is only significant at p<.10 in a two-tailed test while the difference of the lowest to the 
upper income group is significant at any conventional level. There is no difference in 
the life satisfaction averages of men and women while rightwing voters are more 
satisfied than their leftwing counterparts, a difference that is significant at the ten 
percent level.
21 Keeping the differences in levels in mind, we now proceed to the 
empirical results of estimating the effects of government involvement in the economy. 
 
Results 
Figure 1 provides a first look of the association between the government’s share in GDP 
and the percentage of persons with a high level of life satisfaction. Judging from this 
simple plot, government activity is negatively correlated with life satisfaction (ρ = -.54) 
which seems to strongly support the public choice view in hypothesis 1b. It equally 
contradicts the positive view of neoclassical economics. However suggestive this 
picture is, it can never be taken as evidence in itself. Table 3 therefore presents the basic 
results of our multivariate model estimated on the full sample. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                 
21 Although, overall, the shares of completely satisfied persons do not differ between men and women, 
there seems to be systematic variation in the difference between male and female satisfaction across 
countries. We plan to explore this difference in future work. 
  14Column 1 reports the result of the baseline specification, showing results well-known 
from the previous literature. First of all, average income does not matter, which is in 
line with previous research (e.g. Easterlin, 1995; Oswald, 1997).
22 Second, having a 
postcommunist past is strongly detrimental to life satisfaction; people in these countries 
are on average 17 percentage points less likely to be satisfied with their lives. Third, 
social trust exerts a positive effect with a coefficient indicating that a one standard 
deviation shock to trust induces an increase of roughly four percentage points, or a fifth 
of a standard deviation. The results also suggest that globalization in the form of 
openness to trade and the investment price level, which comes to work as a proxy for 
the business climate and production quality, both exert significantly positive effects on 
life satisfaction. One standard deviation shocks to any of these variables are associated 
with increases in life satisfaction of about a quarter of a standard deviation; hence, the 
effects of these variables are of both statistical and social significance.  
Turning to the main question of this paper, the baseline results quite clearly 
allow us to reject hypothesis 1a: governments in general do not act as benevolent 
dictators interested in overall life satisfaction, as the estimate on the government’s share 
of GDP is negative and highly significant. The effect is also socially significant as a one 
standard deviation shock to government spending induces a decline in life satisfaction 
of about a fifth of a standard deviation. Hence, our a priori hypothesis 1b receives 
strong empirical support. An explanatory power of about .75-.8 and an insignificant 
Ramsey RESET test for misspecification (p<.23) show that our model also fits the data 
quite well; hence, it is unlikely that the results are spurious due to misspecification. 
                                                 
22 However, DiTella, MacCulloch, and Oswald (2003) report a positive link from income to well-being. 
  15Using an IV approach furthermore allows us to reject that the negative sign of the 
coefficient is a product of reverse causality. 
23  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In the following columns we test hypotheses 2-4 for the total population by including 
three additional variables and their interaction terms with the government’s share of 
GDP. Starting in column 2, we test for hypothesis 2. The interaction term of 
government effectiveness and activity is individually significant while the interaction 
term and government effectiveness are jointly significant at the five percent level. 
However, as the level of joint significance is slightly lower than that of the interaction 
term in itself, it seems fair to take this as evidence of an alleviating impact of 
government effectiveness on the detrimental influence of governments’ involvement in 
the economy. There is thus tentative evidence in favour of hypothesis 2. The 
specification in column 3 includes political competition and its interaction with 
government activity to test hypotheses 3a and 3b. As can be seen from the table, the 
results show no conclusive evidence. On the one hand, political competition in itself 
exerts a positive effect with high scores on the Herfindahl index indicating low levels of 
competition. On the other hand, the interaction term is jointly significant with the 
political competition variable only, and only at the ten percent level, potentially 
showing that the impact of government activities is independent from the level of 
                                                 
23 By applying a set of instrumental variables, the causality issue can be resolved. The log to GDP per 
capita, openness, a dummy for civil law countries and the investment price relative to the overall price 
level are valid as instruments (F=10.95; pseudo R square=.387; Sargan test p<.47). The IV estimate 
supports that government has a causal effect as the coefficient remains negative and significant at 
conventional levels (-.645, standard error=.297). 
  16political competition in a country. The sign of the interaction term, however, indicates 
support for hypothesis 3a. But as it is not individually significant, further analysis is 
needed.  
Turning to hypotheses 4a and 4b (column 4), the results are more conclusive. 
Both median political ideology and its interaction term with government spending are 
individually significant at the five percent level and jointly significant at the one percent 
level. As the sign of the interaction term is positive, the results in column 4 provide 
support for hypotheses 4b: government involvement in the economy exerts a stronger 
negative influence in countries with a leftwing median ideology of the governing 
bodies.  
Finally, column 5 includes all additional variables and interaction terms in the 
baseline model. The coefficient of the share of government in GDP remains strongly 
negatively associated with life satisfaction. The results also show that the effects of 
political competition, median ideology and its interaction with government activity 
remain significant although the latter just fails to meet the five percent level of 
significance. Hence, only hypothesis 1 and the complementary hypothesis 4b receive 
real support in Table 3. At first sight, it therefore seems that there is no support for a 
neoclassical view on government but considerable support for the public choice view, 
and only political ideology of government appears to matter as transmission channel. 
However, whether these results are robust and relevant for most countries is not obvious 
from Table 3. 
In Table 4, we perform three robustness checks on these findings for the total 
population: we exclude observations with a residual larger than ±1.5 standard deviations 
(in the columns denoted ‘No outliers’), and we exclude the bottom and top ten percent 
  17of the distribution of the government’s share of GDP (denoted ‘No bottom’ and ‘No 
top’, respectively), thereby testing whether the results are driven by observations with 
extremely small or extremely large governments, respectively. The first test is standard, 
while cutting off the tails of the distribution can be thought of as both a statistical 
robustness test and a test of the policy relevance to the majority of the countries in the 
sample. If the statistical associations are driven by observations with either very small 
or very large government sector, the results might not hold a real policy relevance for 
the bulk of the world consisting of countries that are in the middle range. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Starting in columns 1-3, the table reports the tests of whether the evidence supporting 
hypothesis 2 is robust. While column 1 shows that although neither effectiveness nor its 
interaction with government size is individually significant, they remain jointly 
significant when excluding outliers. However, when excluding the observations at either 
tail of the government size distribution, the results lose significance at any conventional 
level; excluding observations with very small government shares in particular reduces 
the significance level and even makes the coefficient of government effectiveness 
change sign. Hence, even if we cannot conclusively reject the hypothesis that the 
negative effects of government involvement in the economy are alleviated by having an 
effective government sector, this association is probably only relevant for countries that 
have small governments in the first place.  
In columns 4-6, we test the robustness of the beneficial impact of political 
competition suggested in hypothesis 3a. Excluding outliers, political competition and 
  18the interaction term are jointly significant at the one percent level while competition in 
itself is only significant at the ten percent level, which might indicate that the interaction 
effect is relevant. Nevertheless, this effect is evidently driven by observations with very 
small governments, i.e. by countries that have a relatively small ‘problem’ with 
government involvement in the economy anyway. As the exclusion of observations with 
particularly large government shares reveals that the joint significance is most likely due 
to the effect of political competition in itself, we conclude that the support for 
hypothesis 3a is not robust. 
The evidence in columns 7-9, to the contrary, supports hypothesis 4b, which 
states that countries with a leftwing tradition are on average hurt more by excessive 
government involvement in the economy. The interaction term is individually 
significant at the five percent level throughout while median ideology only fails to be 
significant when excluding observations with particularly little government involvement 
in the economy. Both variables are jointly significant at the five percent level in two 
cases, but only at the ten percent level when excluding observations with small 
governments. As the coefficient of the interaction term is larger than in Table 3, is about 
the same size in columns 7 and 8 and somewhat larger again in column 9, the evidence 
for hypothesis 4b is robust to these simple tests. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
As a final test, Table 5 replicates the robustness exercise using the seven 
subgroups of society, based on income, gender or political ideology, to test whether our 
estimation results are specific to any of these groups. It is quite obvious that the results 
  19pertaining to government effectiveness fair no better than in Table 4, as this variable 
and the interaction term are significant in only three groups. Furthermore, they always 
lose significance when excluding observations with large residuals, or observations in 
the bottom or top ten percent of the distribution of the government share variable. 
Moreover, the results pertaining to political competition fare even worse as the 
interaction term is never individually or jointly significant. In sum, there is thus no 
robust support for hypotheses 2, 3a or 3b. On the other hand, the effect of the 
government’s share of GDP in itself always remains significant. 
Turning to the results pertaining to median political ideology, the interaction 
term is significant in all subgroups and ideology per se only fails individual significance 
at the ten percent level in the case of leftwing voters.
24 The results are furthermore 
robust to excluding outliers in all cases, and robust to excluding the tails of the 
government share distribution (not shown) in four cases: the full sample, the lower 
income group, men and the rightwing voters.
25 We must therefore conclude that the 
evidence for hypothesis 4b seems fairly robust.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                 
24 Combining the insignificance of median ideology in the leftwing sample with the observation that 
rightwing voters on average seem to be more satisfied than their leftwing counterparts, one can speculate 
whether the difference between left and right satisfaction pertains to moderately rightwing voters being 
more satisfied with their lives.  
25 As stressed above, the life satisfaction data for the subsamples are probably measured with 
considerably more noise as they rely on smaller samples. It should therefore be noted that although the 
interaction term is not significant in the middle and upper income groups, for leftwing voters and for 
women, it remains of the same sign and size throughout.  
  20Table 6 displays calculations of the effects of a one standard deviation increase in the 
government’s share in GDP on an average country for life satisfaction. Columns 1 to 3 
evaluate the effects of the shock at the minimum government share of GDP, the 
maximum share, the median, and the average. Beginning at the average or median 
government share, a one deviation shock induces approximately a four-point decline in 
the share of completely satisfied persons, corresponding to about a fifth of a standard 
deviation. Obviously, the inclusion of interaction terms does not influence the size of 
the effect at the average, as the coefficient throughout all three columns in Table 6 is 
identical to the one identified in Table 3. Relying on estimates that are overly affected 
by observations with very small governments as Table 4 suggests, the shock at the 
minimum effectiveness induces an eight-point loss of life satisfaction while at 
maximum effectiveness the effect of the shock is virtually zero. As regards political 
competition, the fragile results for this variable are reflected in column 2 where the 
effects are mainly due to a decline in political competition per se.  
On the other hand, the fairly robust alleviating effects of median political 
ideology on the government’s share of GDP are reflected in column 3. At the far left on 
a left-to-right scale of political ideology, a one standard deviation shock to the 
government’s share of GDP induces a loss of nine points, corresponding to 45 percent 
of a standard deviation of life satisfaction. On the other hand, at the far right on the 
ideology scale, a similar shock is almost entirely ineffectual. Using the interaction term 
to evaluate the effects of a shock to median ideology instead also leads to interesting 
insights. Overall, it seems that having a rightwing political ideology leads to a loss of 
life satisfaction. However, this only occurs at fairly low levels of government shares, 
and the effect turns positive above a level of government’s share in GDP of 
  21approximately 15 percent. Overall, we can therefore conclude that the government’s 
share in GDP exerts a negative effect on life satisfaction, and that this effect is somehow 
associated with the median political ideology although in a non-trivial manner. The final 
section discusses these findings and concludes. 
 
Conclusions 
We have in this paper analyzed the question whether government involvement in the 
economy is conducive or detrimental to life satisfaction. Our paper therefore provides 
what can be thought of as a test of a longstanding dispute between standard neoclassical 
economic theory, which predicts that governments play an unambiguously positive role 
for individuals’ quality of life, and public choice theory, that was developed to 
understand why governments often choose excessive involvement and regulation and 
thus risk harming voters’ subjective quality of life. We perform this test by regressing 
the reported share of completely satisfied people in about 70 countries across the world 
on a set of baseline variables and the government’s share of GDP. 
The evidence quite clearly supports the public choice view that excessive 
government involvement is detrimental to individuals’ quality of life. We test whether 
this negative influence depends on: 1) the effectiveness of the government sector, which 
could make voters more tolerant of government activities; 2) the degree of political 
competition, which could both insure voters against special interest bias as well as 
making government’s direct involvement less precisely directed towards the preferences 
of the median voter; and 3) the median political ideology through the preceding decade, 
which might both proxy for voters’ preferences for public goods and the structure of 
government spending. 
  22We find an alleviating effect of government effectiveness, which is 
nonetheless driven by observations with particularly little government involvement. The 
effect of this factor is thus only relevant to a few countries that already have a relatively 
‘small’ government problem. We can also unambiguously reject the potentially 
alleviating effects of political competition that are never significant. Contrary to this, we 
find that the detrimental effects of government involvement increase as the political 
ideology of the median voter moves to the left. Although one could, based on standard 
conceptions of ideology, believe that populations voting on the left of the political 
middle would tend to accept more active government, we do find evidence of the exact 
opposite. 
As the evidence thus goes against popular beliefs, a more reasonable explanation 
seems to be that governments of different political convictions structure their spending 
and interventions differently. One could, for example, speculate whether the effects 
derive from leftwing governments intervening more directly or otherwise structuring 
spending in a way that limits personal choice more than rightwing governments do. 
However, a number of alternative explanations are possible. We therefore conclude with 
a rather simple policy implication: governments interested in maximizing the life 
satisfaction of their voters should, regardless of their ideology, limit their direct 
interventions in the economy to allow voters a high degree of personal freedom. Yet, 
whether specific types of government spending and activity are more detrimental to 
satisfaction than others and whether types of spending exist that are positively 
associated with satisfaction are questions we leave to future research. 
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  27Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable   Average  Minimum  Maximum  Std. dev.  Obs. 
Life  satisfaction       
 Full  sample  42.822  9.545  77.685  20.156  74 
 Lower  income  36.473  3.572  73.196  19.006  70 
 Middle  income  41.972  6.269  80.988  21.198  70 
 Upper  income  51.092  6.013  87.624  20.303  70 
 Female  43.442  7.716  77.729  19.678  72 
 Male  42.391  8.646  77.076  20.544  72 
 Leftwing  41.188  8.919  77.477  20.251  69 
  Rightwing  47.075 12.256 83.293 19.841  69 
       
Social trust  27.819  4.752  63.865  13.743  74 
Openness    78.143  15.428 324.437 52.866  74 
Investment price  .855  .261  1.659  .337  74 
Log GDP per capita  9.051  6.178  10.692  .985  74 
Postcommunist .270  0  1  .447  74 
Government share of GDP  18.454  6.014  49.664  8.987  74 
Government effectiveness  .528  -1.140  2.263  1.033  74 
Political competition  .72  .25  1  2.23  73 
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Table 2. Correlations between interacting variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Life satisfaction  1  .542***  .650***  -.127  .178 
Government share of GDP    1  -.475***  -.067  -.098 
Government effectiveness      1  -.153  .115 
Political  competition     1  .042 
Median  ideology       1 
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Table 3. Basic results 
Sample Full  sample 
  1 2 3 4 5 


































































   -4.8275 
(3.2461) 
Effectiveness * share    .2798** 
(.1383) 
   .2152 
(.1543) 
















Observations  74 74 73 73 73 
Pseudo R square   .806  .809  .800  .804  .808 
F  statistic  54.64 56.95 45.41 41.66 40.52 
RMSE  8.889 8.809 8.878 8.791 8.705 
Joint significance, F=    1.551**  1.505*  2.508***  1.511* 
Note: all regressions include a constant term and regional dummies; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at 




 Table 4. Robustness results 
  Full sample 
  No outliers  No bottom  No top  No outliers  No bottom  No top  No outliers  No bottom  No top 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 






















































































































      






      






   






   












Observations  62 67 67 65 66 66 65 66 66 
Pseudo R square   .838  .812  .777  .  .809  .781  .916  .818  .784 
F  statistic  72.49 44.70 38.04 67.67 47.17 37.62 67.48 44.03 37.83 
RMSE  8.432 8.943 9.342 6.068 8.856 9.123 5.835 8.659 9.067 
Joint significance, F=  2.075***  .538  1.322  2.532***  .322  1.465*  3.977***  1.515*  1.748** 
Note: all regressions include a constant term and regional dummies; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. In columns denoted ‘No outliers’, 
observations with residuals above ±1.5 standard deviations have been deleted; columns denoted ‘No bottom’ (‘No top’) excludes the 10% observations with the 
smallest (largest) government share of GDP.
  31Table 5. Robustness with subsamples 
Sample:  Income groups  Gender groups  Political groups 
 Lower  Middle  Upper  Male  Female  Left  Right 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 










































Observations  70 70 70 72 72 69 69 
Pseudo R square   .783  .771  .736  .799  .791  .795  .785 
F  statistic  54.87 41.48 33.40 69.47 46.65 64.79 38.10 
RMSE 8.849  10.153  10.433  9.199  8.995  9.174  9.194 
Joint significance, F=  .428  .719  1.839***  1.195  1.978***  1.140  .726 
Robust  No No No No No No No 










































Observations  69 69 69 71 71 68 68 
Pseudo R square   .770  .765  .716  .788  .776  .784  .778 
F  statistic  46.20 39.41 28.18 55.55 34.72 42.58 31.89 
RMSE 8.923  10.140  10.720  9.343  9.181  9.279  9.245 
Joint  significance,  F=  .426 1.258 .793  .772 1.237 .865  .739 
Robust  No No No No No No No 










































Observations  69 69 69 71 71 68 68 
Pseudo R square   .781  .771  .726  .794  .779  .786  .782 
  32F  statistic  46.23 35.86 23.61 45.31 34.99 37.58 30.48 
RMSE 8.701  10.013  10.523  9.205  9.119  9.222  9.147 
Joint significance, F=  1.837**  1.948***  1.822**  1.625**  1.622**  1.201  1.322 
Robust  Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Note: all regressions include the baseline variables; all regressions include a constant term and regional dummies; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) 
[p<.10]. Results are reported to be robust if the interaction term is jointly or individually significant when removing outliers and the tails of the distribution of 
government share of GDP.
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Table 6. Effects of a one standard deviation shock to government share 
Interaction with:  Effectiveness  Competition  Ideology 
 1  2  3 

























      




  34Table A1. Countries included 
Country Government 
share 






Albania 23.99  18.24  -0.47  0.82  -0.05 
Algeria 22.43  29.94  -0.59  0.54  -0.84 
Argentina 14.83  53.92  -0.49  0.90  0.80 
Armenia 32.70  11.11  -0.42  0.86  0.00 
Australia 10.97  60.84  1.84  0.87  -0.20 
Austria 10.14  69.13  1.79  0.51  -0.14 
Azerbaijan 32.22  21.55  -0.96  0.98  0.00 
Bangladesh 10.10  23.34  -0.53  0.88  -0.17 
Belarus 30.54  13.77  -1.03  0.80  -1.00 
Belgium 19.11  62.46  1.85  0.25  0.02 
Brazil 24.81  53.01  -0.22  0.30  0.22 
Bulgaria 33.55  26.04  -0.06  0.85  0.43 
Canada 15.36  66.60  1.88  1.00  -0.40 
Chile 21.38  46.50  1.19  0.38  -0.06 
Colombia 17.72  76.20  -0.39  0.65  0.44 
Croatia 33.86  37.98  0.19  0.89  0.77 
Czech Republic  11.86  47.42 0.70  0.64 0.39 
Denmark 13.38  76.75  1.99  0.59  -0.31 
Dominican Republic  16.72  51.22  -0.41  0.96  0.53 
Egypt 12.64  43.43  -0.32  1.00  0.00 
El Salvador  15.56  57.53  -0.53  1.00  1.00 
Estonia 34.04  27.18  0.78  0.70  0.69 
Finland 7.24  72.68  2.01  0.35  0.11 
France 8.26  44.27  1.67  0.65  -0.19 
Georgia 32.37  16.93  -0.77  0.46  0.12 
Germany 11.64  61.63  1.76  0.58  0.50 
Greece 12.30  41.57  0.79 1.00 -0.40 
Hungary 13.21  26.27  0.78  0.59  0.07 
Iceland 12.85  74.43  1.98  0.54  0.49 
India 29.44  9.55  -0.13  0.64  -0.69 
Indonesia 21.29  40.81  -0.56  0.95  0.00 
Ireland 12.16  69.74  1.62  0.70  0.60 
Israel 32.22  47.98  1.02  0.41  0.03 
Italy 9.77  49.24  0.91  0.78  0.08 
Japan 6.01  36.47  1.07  0.78  0.75 
Jordan 49.66  23.63  0.36  0.76  0.00 
Latvia 26.98  19.80  0.67  0.57  0.40 
Lithuania 29.30  21.96  0.61  0.74  -0.38 
Luxembourg 11.07  65.75  2.13  0.51  -0.44 
Macedonia 25.71  20.61 -0.39  0.37 -0.52 
Malta 25.61  72.49  1.16  1.00  0.60 
Mexico 10.24  71.67  0.15  1.00  -1.00 
Moldova 33.82  11.67  -0.63  0.90  -0.58 
Morocco 16.72  29.41  0.07  0.28  0.37 
Netherlands 13.81  69.48  2.14  0.45  0.33 
New Zealand  8.35  63.57  1.97  0.83  0.74 
Nigeria 12.56  46.39  -1.12  1.00  0.00 
Norway 7.07  63.93  1.84  0.76  -0.35 
Pakistan 23.50  9.69  -0.50  0.85  -0.07 
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Peru 14.17  35.50  -0.47  0.60  0.93 
Philippines 16.53  42.01  -0.06  0.73  0.46 
Poland 7.29  38.79  0.61  0.52  -0.74 
Portugal 19.18  41.04  1.03  1.00  0.00 
Romania 12.17  26.63  -0.33  0.62  0.38 
Russia 22.71  17.56  -0.40  0.49  0.48 
Singapore 7.98  47.96  2.26  1.00  0.00 
Slovakia 16.47  30.05  0.40  0.63  -0.84 
Slovenia 23.55  53.98  0.82  0.43  -0.06 
South Korea  6.94  31.20  0.84  0.93  1.00 
Spain 6.48  42.80  1.53  0.90  -0.25 
Sweden 18.78  62.96  1.84  0.68  -0.45 
Switzerland 9.78  75.12  2.26  0.27  0.06 
Taiwan 15.64  33.16  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Tanzania 23.45  18.34  -0.51  0.65  -0.77 
Turkey 14.32  28.52  -0.20  0.60  0.34 
Uganda 28.14  25.03  -0.41  0.69  0.05 
Ukraine 29.96  16.71  -0.74  0.48  -0.33 
United Kingdom  8.57  57.08  2.03  1.00  0.40 
Uruguay 20.56  60.35  0.51  0.42  0.81 
USA 12.83  46.92  1.70  1.00  0.20 
Venezuela 15.52  59.52  -1.14  0.58  -0.46 
Vietnam 18.45  31.41  -0.27  1.00  -1.00 
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